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New Horizons or a Strategic Mirage? 




In this paper we contribute to the debate between researchers who argue that the emergence of 
online distribution allows content producers in the creative industries to bypass powerful 
publishers and distributors, and other researchers who argue that this strategy cannot succeed 
without the complementary assets that these intermediaries provide. We use a case study of 
the Dutch Video Game Developer (DVGD) bringing to market an identical game using two 
different but comparable distribution channels as a quasi-experiment: In the first release 
DVGD used online distribution to reach consumers directly, whereas in the second it used an 
alliance with an established video game publisher. We find that, while the alliance required 
DVGD to share with the publisher a substantial fraction of the value appropriated by the 
game, the alliance strategy resulted in greater absolute financial performance and relative 
market performance compared to the self-publishing strategy. We conclude that the 
differences in performance can be traced back to specialized complementary assets required 








Technological advancements have dramatically increased the ability of content 
producing entrepreneurs in the creative industries to commercialize their output directly to 
consumers without having to rely on powerful publishers and distributors as intermediaries. 
This change has meant that content-producing entrepreneurs can now singlehandedly publish 
their content onto online stores such as Apple’s iTunes, Amazon’s Kindle store, or Nintendo’s 
WiiWare. The shift to what has been referred to as ‘artist-led-distribution’ (Clemons and 
Lang, 2003) has set off a debate on whether this tilts the fundamental balance power within 
creative industries in favor of content producers, or it represents an additional means of 
distribution with limited strategic potential (Bockstedt et al., 2006).  
On the one hand, we have researchers that argue that such artist-led-distribution will 
revolutionize the creative industries, allowing content-producing entrepreneurs to bypass the 
traditional reliance on publishers, and appropriate the full value of their creativity (Bockstedt 
et al., 2006; Clemons et al., 2003; Clemons and Lang, 2003). At the same time, other 
researchers have been more critical, arguing that notwithstanding the opportunities offered by 
the Internet, the lack of complementary assets, such as marketing capabilities, relationships 
with gatekeepers, and organizational reputation will keep content producing entrepreneurs 
dependent on established publishers well into the future (Colombo et al., 2006; Gans and 
Stern, 2003; Mol et al., 2005; Rothaermel, 2001).  
In this paper we contribute to this debate in the context of the video game industry. 
We examine the difficulties and opportunities entrepreneurial content producers face in 
commercializing their content using the online channel. Specifically, we look at a single case 
study of the Dutch Video Game Developer (DVGD) bringing to market an identical game 
using two different but comparable online distribution channels: In the first release DVGD 
used online distribution to reach consumers directly, whereas in the second it used an alliance 
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with an established video game publisher. Our results show that the alliance strategy resulted 
in greater net revenues and higher relative market performance compared to the self-
publishing strategy. Since an identical game was involved in both instances, we argue that the 
differences in performance can be traced to specialized complementary assets required for 
successful commercialization.  
The paper takes advantage of this naturally occurring quasi-experiment to contribute 
to our understanding of the value creating interaction between content producers and 
publishers in the creative industries. Although some research has examined this relationship 
previously, most of this research has been conceptual (Bockstedt et al., 2006; Teece, 2006). 
Our paper therefore makes an empirical contribution to this area of research. It also makes a 
contribution to emerging empirical research on strategy in the online economy (Amit and 
Zott, 2001; Yadav and Varadarajan, 2005). Specifically, our study examines to what extent 
content producer strategies that were shaped by the traditional ‘bricks-and-mortar’ offline 
economy, have been rendered obsolete by technological advancements, i.e. online 
distribution. We provide evidence for the proposition that notwithstanding the much lower 
costs of online distribution in the creative industries, other factors, specifically, specialized 
complementary assets that are embedded in market knowledge, mass media selection, and 
relationships with gatekeepers – lead content producers to retain alliances with publishers as 
an important strategic option.  
The structure of the paper is as follows: The next section provides a theoretical 
background on the advantages and disadvantages for small-sized, technology-based, firms to 
engage in strategic alliances with incumbent firms compared to independent 
commercialization strategies. This section is followed by application of these insights to the 
context of creative industries. Hereafter the methodology is discussed, after which the results 
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of our study are presented. The paper ends with a discussion, conclusion, and directions for 
future research. 
 
2. The role of specialized complementary assets in commercialization of innovations 
In his seminal piece on Profiting From Innovation (PFI), David Teece (1986) provides 
a framework for innovators to determine how they are best positioned vis-à-vis vertical 
competitors in the value chain for subtracting economic rents from their products. According 
to the framework, a firm should base its commercialization strategy on access to 
complementary assets, which are those assets or capabilities that go beyond the mere 
technical knowledge of the innovation itself (Teece, 1986; 2006). Complementary assets 
include tangible resources, such as financial capital (Pemaratne, 2001; Malekci and Tootle, 
1996), and intangible resources such as marketing skills (Teece, 2010), referrals and contacts 
(Stuart et al., 1999), and proprietary distribution channels (Teece, 1986).  
By contrast to generic complementary assets that are easily obtainable in the market, 
and thus have limited strategic importance, specialized complementary assets are strategically 
important because they are not readily available in the market place (Barney, 1991; 
Rothaermel and Hill, 2005). Specialized complementary assets are usually inimitable, scarce, 
and difficult to reproduce. They are the product of idiosyncratic investments, are usually path 
dependent, and require significant time to develop. Their scarcity is often due to incumbent 
firms preemptively acquiring these assets, and then withholding availability to new entrants 
(Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006; Teece, 1992; Teece et al., 1997). Research suggests that firms 
that lack the specialized complementary assets needed for successful commercialization of 
their innovations should secure access to these assets through acquisitions – if financial 
resources are adequate and suitable target firms can be found – or strategic alliances if willing 
partners are available (Gans et al., 2002; Teece, 1986; 2006). 
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Small-sized, technology-based, firms often find themselves facing large incumbent 
firms who exercise control over specialized complementary assets (Colombo et al., 2006; 
Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004; Street and Cameron, 2007).  Since capital constraints prevent 
small firms from acquiring these specialized complementary assets, and “renting” these assets 
is often not a viable option (Arora and Ceccagnoli 2006), access can only be granted by 
forming alliances with incumbents (Colombo et al., 2006; Gans and Stern, 2003; Rothaermel 
and Deeds, 2004; Teece, 2010). While this is generally seen as a positive strategic move 
(Prashantham and Birkinshaw, 2008; Stuart et al., 1999), the cost of the alliance might 
outstrip its advantages if the incumbent uses its market power to force the innovator to accept 
a distribution of economic rents that is highly unfavorable to the latter (Teece, 2006).  
Technological advancements, such as the advent of online distribution, create new 
strategic options for small resource-strapped firms that face strong incumbents (Barras, 1990; 
Kretschmer et al., 1999). In the creative industries, in particular, the advent of online 
distribution means that entrepreneurial content producers (e.g. video game developers, music 
producers, or writers) no longer have to rely on specialized complementary assets owners 
such as publishing houses, and brick-and-mortar retailers, to reach their end consumer. Rather 
than engaging in alliances under tight economic constraints, small firms can now opt to 
bypass complementary asset owners altogether, offering their product directly to the 
consumer.    
Having this option, however, does not automatically translate into a viable strategy. 
Researchers generally accept that specialized complementary assets generate additional sales 
(Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006; Nerkar and Roberts, 2004). They also agree that specialized 
complementary assets are costly to create and maintain, and by the same token, are costly to 
purchase or rent. The critical question that must be addressed, therefore, is whether the cost 
savings of vertical strategic bypassing of established publishing actors will make up for the 
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additional rents that can be generated through the use of the publisher’s specialized 
complementary assets?    
The next section provides an overview of this calculation. The succeeding section 
discusses the debate on the advantages and disadvantages of vertical bypassing versus 
alliances in creative industries. In particular, we examine the two opposing views: The first 
argues in favor of pursuing an independent, artist-led-distribution strategy, while the other 
favors the formation of strategic alliances. After identifying the specialized complementary 
assets that are important to success in creative industries, we propose that the relative 
performance of small-sized, technology-based, firms that lack the specialized complementary 
assets is higher when forming an alliance strategy as opposed to an artist-led-distribution 
strategy. 
 
2.1. Why small firms should (not) form a strategic alliance 
Spekman, Isabella, and MacAvoy’s (2000: p. 37) define strategic alliances as “close, 
collaborative relationships between two, or more, firms with the intent of accomplishing 
mutually compatible goals that would be difficult for each to accomplish alone.” The 
complementary assets motive for alliance formation is particularly common to small-sized, 
technology-based firms that focus on commercially exploiting technological innovations 
(Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Gans and Stern, 2003). These firms possess distinctive 
technological competencies relating to a new product, process or service idea, that need to be 
used in conjunction with specialized complementary assets in order to generate economic 
returns. Small-sized, technology-based firms can benefit from specialized complementary 
assets of prospective partners when shortage of time and lack of resources, make it difficult to 
independently reproduce or imitate these specialized assets. 
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Apart from benefitting from the use of the specialized complementary resources that 
are made available by alliance partners, small firms also benefit from the implicit and explicit 
endorsement that an alliance with large incumbents usually brings (Colombo et al., 2006; 
Prashantham and Birkinshaw, 2008; Stuart et al., 1999).  This can be particularly valuable in 
situations when the strengths of small firms and the merits of their products are hard to assess 
(e.g., highly uncertain market, absence of reputation of small firm). In these circumstances, 
the establishment of a relationship with a reputable firm can signal to other actors in the value 
system (e.g., suppliers, distributors, retailers, and consumers) that the small firm is 
trustworthy, and that its offerings are of good quality (Meyer et al., 1997; DiMaggio, 1988; 
Stuart et al., 1999).  
The advantages of alliances with large incumbents that own specialized 
complementary assets must, however, be considered against the difficulty of negotiating and 
obtaining adequate returns. Owners of specialized complementary assets are adept at 
negotiating complex contracts that offer attractive terms upfront, but in several respects often 
turn out to be disadvantageous for the content producers.  
First, content producers often lack the experience needed to understand the nuance of 
contracting downstream value chain activities. They are therefore more likely to sign 
agreements that will surrender significant revenue stream to their more experienced partner. 
Second, market sales often depend on the owner of specialized complementary assets exerting 
maximum efforts in promoting and distributing the product. Such efforts are difficult to 
specify in contracts, and are often also difficult to monitor. Content producers are therefore 
exposed to the risk that complementary asset owners do not fully live up their promises and 
act opportunistically by cutting back on their commitment if they believe these resources are 
employed better elsewhere.    Finally, even after the alliance has been agreed, relying on large 
incumbents for critical resources also puts small firms at risk of opportunistic exploitation that 
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is difficult to control using a multi-contingency contract (see Williamson, 1991; Prashantham 
and Birkinshaw, 2008).  
This risk is of particular concern when alliances deal with fungible and reproducible 
resources such as knowledge, or require access that may reveal trade secrets. It is further 
complicated by the hazard of long-term resource dependence and the sharing of economic 
rents. From a long term perspective, an additional hazard of partnering with a large incumbent 
is that a small firm can become overly dependent on larger partners that control resources 
crucial for commercialization. When the incumbent’s market power is derived from having 
control over important specialized complementary assets, small firms might also end up 
handing over the lion’s share of the value appropriation to the large incumbent (Rey and 
Tirole, 1997). 
 
2.2. Artist-led-distribution versus strategic alliance in creative industries 
The fundamental choice between following an artist-led-distribution strategy and a 
strategic alliance strategy has previously been studied in settings in which this issue has 
particular salience, namely the creative industries. Some scholars have argued that small-
sized, entrepreneurial content producers in these industries can dispense with incumbent 
publishers altogether, pursing a direct-to-market, or artist-led-distribution strategy. Others, 
however, argue that publishers perform a vital function that is as important in the era of online 
distribution as it was during the time when reaching final consumers required the movement 
of physical products across a complex supply chain. The following sections explore both 
views. 
 
2.2.1 Independent commercialization strategy: Artist-led-distribution 
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A number of researchers have argued that online technologies such as the Internet will 
revolutionize creative industries and allow entrepreneurial content producers to independently 
publish and fully appropriate value of their creativity, making incumbent publishers obsolete 
(Bockstedt et al., 2006; Clemons et al., 2003; Clemons and Lang, 2003). Their argument 
flows from a decoupling of information goods from physical media, resulting in publishers 
losing their ability to appropriate revenue streams from physical reproduction and 
distribution. In addition, as the costs of reproduction and online distribution of digitizable 
content become negligible, publishers’ scale-based resource advantages that create entry 
barriers are largely eliminated.  
Since the value appropriation of creative content disproportionally accrues to 
publishers, entrepreneurial content producers are motivated to bypass the publisher and offer 
their content directly to the consumer to achieve higher profit margins (Mol et al., 2005). The 
advent of digital distribution channels therefore allows entrepreneurial content producers to 
shift to artist-led-distribution, making the position of publishers progressively uncertain, and 
their future untenable (Clemons and Lang, 2003). 
 
2.2.2. Alliance-based commercialization strategy 
Another group of researchers have argued that although online distribution channels 
may tilt the balance of power in favor of entrepreneurial content producers by eroding entry 
barriers, the ability to reach consumers does not necessarily improve sales performance: 
Consumers still face information asymmetries when it comes to selecting from the variety of 
offerings. Reducing these information asymmetries require specialized complementary assets 
that cannot easily be developed in-house or obtained via contracting (Caves, 2000; 
Kretschmer et al., 2001). The only viable alternative available to content producers is 
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therefore the formation of strategic alliances with incumbent publishers that control these 
assets (Mol et al., 2005).  
To understand why complementary assets retain their importance even in 
environments where content producers can directly reach consumers it is important to bear in 
mind that consumers in creative industries often turn to professional reviewers for ‘expert’ 
opinion when making their product selection (Lampel and Shamsie, 2000; Priem 2007; 
Wijnberg and Gemser, 2000). In principle, these external experts are expected to review and 
provide opinion on all, if not most, product offerings. In practice, external experts are more 
likely to review product offerings that are brought to their attention by publishers and 
distributors – in part because publishers and distributors often have long-standing 
relationships with reviewers, and in part because in general reviewers take it as a given that 
their time and effort is better spent on evaluating products that are more likely to be widely 
distributed.  
Indirectly, therefore, publishers perform the important role of selecting and certifying 
quality for consumers (Clemons and Lang, 2003). In this role they undertake the crucial task 
of reducing the information asymmetry that may exist between content producers and key 
actors in their industry (Caves, 2000). In conjunction with this activity, they also seek to 
promote the content.  Once selection has been made, publishers usually commit resources to 
draw market attention to the product. Market attention contributes to market performance, but 
it also has the added impact of signaling to other actors that the product meets the quality 
standards expected by established industry players. 
 
2.3. Specialized complementary assets in the creative industries 
The calculation of whether the advantages of partnering with owners of 
complementary specialized assets outweigh the risks depends very much on how the 
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industry’s value chain characteristics provide the basis for creating sustainable competitive 
advantage. Creative industries require a range of complementary assets for successful 
commercialization of new products (Caves, 2000; Hirsch, 1972). Based on a review of the 
literature we identify four prevailing specialized complementary assets which are deployed by 
incumbent publishers for increasing the probability of successful commercialization, and that 
content producers can access by forming alliances.  
The first specialized complementary asset is a large portfolio of content. Firms that 
operate in creative industries generally face winner-takes-all markets in which competition 
leads to highly skewed market share distribution (De Vany, 2004; De Vany and Walls, 1996). 
Since the success of individual products is difficult to predict upfront, nor easily explained ex-
post (Broekhuizen et al., 2011; Caves, 2000), publishers rely far less on internal product 
evaluation when selecting which products to launch, preferring instead to follow the principle 
of “let the market decide” (Hirsch, 1972). In other words, they release as many products as 
their resources will allow, and then actively support only those products that demonstrate 
consumer appeal.      
To sustain this strategy publishers often amass large game portfolios. Large portfolios 
increase the probability of having ‘hits’ that will offset the low revenues that are generated by 
less successful games. In addition to hedging financial risk, large portfolios also provide 
bargaining power against platform holders who facilitate digital storefronts, and thus can be 
used to negotiate preferential ‘shelf spacing’ and higher revenue margins. Finally, another 
advantage of having a large portfolio is the ability to lower transaction costs for consumers. 
As  Kasper and Streit (1998: p. 231) point out, suppliers of experience goods often compete 
by reducing transaction costs for buyers by offering catalogues that consumers can 
conveniently peruse, as opposed to undertaking the costly process of searching for products 
that meet their preferences across multiple retail points. In the case of digital distribution, 
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these catalogues give publishers the added advantage of cross-promoting content. This cross-
promotion is often linked to recommendation engines that direct consumers to other offerings 
within the catalogue based on their past purchases and preferences.    
The second specialized complementary asset is superior marketing skills and assets. 
The oversupply of content that is characteristic of creative industries presents publishers with 
the challenge of attracting public attention (Caves, 2000). Since consumer awareness of these 
products hinges almost exclusively on mass-media coverage, successful publishers leverage 
and cultivate their relationships with the mass media with a view to obtaining favorable 
reviews in magazines and newspapers (Elberse and Anand, 2007). This is done not only by 
appointing staff whose job is to get to know journalists that review new products, but also by 
purchasing advertising space in the same media outlets. More recently, the rise of websites 
and social media has opened new promotional channels that should in principle reduce the 
power of incumbency. In practice, however, the sheer number and diversity of these 
information sites favor incumbent publishers that have the resources necessary to develop a 
marketing campaign that targets these sites individually.  
The third specialized complementary asset that plays a crucial role in successful 
commercialization of content is having relationships with gatekeepers. Content becomes 
successful by the virtue of selection by gatekeepers that control access to the market, and by 
institutional actors that evaluate released content (Lampel et al., 2000). In the video game 
industry, platform owners act as access gatekeepers, granting or denying content access to 
their platforms. When it comes to deciding which games should be given access, platform 
owners usually rely on publishers’ advice and support. They attribute to publishers superior 
market-sensing qualities, i.e. publishers are assumed to have extensive knowledge about 
supply side variables in terms of what content is being offered and selecting the most 
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promising content. Due to these qualities, they are able to maintain closely-knit relationships 
with access gatekeepers to stimulate the chances of acceptance (Mol et al., 2005).  
Strong relationships with access gatekeepers are a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for ensuring publishers’ strategic success. In the creative industries, product market 
selection is also strongly influenced by institutional actors such as mass-media critics and 
award-giving bodies that evaluate and broadcast product quality (Eliashberg et al. 2006). 
These evaluations exercise strong informative and persuasive impact on consumers, and by 
extension have the capacity of creating a bandwagon effect that can radically change the 
revenue potential of games (Elberse and Anand, 2007; Gemser et al., 2008).    
Lastly, having a reputation or reputable name is an important intangible asset for 
successful commercialization. In markets in which the quality is uncertain but strictly ranked, 
reputation is a valuable asset, as it provides a signal of quality in the eyes of consumers 
(Caves, 2000; Spence, 1973). If entrepreneurial content producers closely cooperate with 
incumbent publishers, the publisher acts as an endorser for content producers that have not 
(yet) established their reputation. The publisher confers legitimacy by signaling to consumers 
and other important market parties, such as mass media, platform owners that the content 
producer is a legitimate partner to work with (Rao et al., 2008). For a new content producer 
this joint stamp of approval by the publisher and the platform owner is often an indispensable 
first step towards establishing a viable position in the industry. 
To conclude, this paper argues that the key premise for forming an alliance is whether 
the lower return that content producers receive for each unit sold will be offset by higher 
market performance as a direct result of capitalizing on the incumbent’s specialized 
complementary assets. The success of a commercialization strategy thus is a function of the 
availability of the specialized complementary assets, and the value the content producer is 
able to appropriate from the product’s market performance. Within the boundaries of the 
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prevailing empirical context, i.e. a situation in which entrepreneurial content producers lack 
specialized complementary assets, we posit that the strategic alliance strategy allows content 
producers to tap into the publisher’s specialized complementary assets, resulting in additional 
rents that are higher than the costs of partnering with the publisher. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Empirical setting: the market for digitally distributed games 
The video game industry is an industry with considerable economic and technological 
significance. In 2010 the worldwide market for console video games and systems comprised 
$38.4 billion (IDG, 2011a). Installments in the latest generation video game machines, 
released between 2005 and 2006, are all equipped with digital storefronts. Nintendo’s 
WiiWare, Sony’s PlayStation Network, and Microsoft’s Xbox Live Arcade form a collective 
market of $1.9 billion in the year 2010. Collectively, taking into account other digital gaming 
platforms such as Steam, Apple’s Appstore, and Facebook’s social gaming platform, the 
market for digitally distributed games is calculated at $20 billion in 2010 (IDG, 2011b).  
These technological advancements have several consequences for the business models 
of video game developers, and for the industry’s value chain. Digital distribution channels can 
be used by the content producing community to bypass barriers to entry. Indeed, lower entry 
barriers to market have led to an increase in the number of content suppliers and lower online 
retail prices. Industry experts are speaking of an ‘App clutter’ as the number of games 
available on certain platforms has risen past 100,000. The resulting price competition is 
putting pressure on the profit margins of new entrants. There are some success stories of 
independent content distributors, but these are few and far between. Surprisingly, 
notwithstanding the odds against succeeding on their own, the independent development 
community is largely of the opinion that publishers no longer fulfill a vital role in 
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commercializing content. Indeed, many go as far as to declare the ‘death’ of publishing as a 
business model. 1   
 
3.2. Case study approach  
A case study methodology fits the exploratory investigation of a contemporary 
phenomenon and matches the research design of the study at hand (Yin, 2009 Flyvbjerg, 
2011). In choosing our methodology we follow other researchers who use a case study 
approach to investigate emerging business practices in nascent markets (e.g. Haefliger et al., 
2010; Jacobides and Bilinger, 2006; Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009; Santos and Eisenhardt, 
2009). Our research question examines the tradeoff between creative content producers 
commercializing their products directly to consumers without the benefit of specialized 
complementary assets, as opposed to commercializing their products through a strategic 
alliance with publishers who can put these specialized complementary assets at their disposal. 
In line with the criteria laid out by Wieviorka (1992) and Thomas (2011) for case 
methodology, this question identifies commercialization of new creative content as the 
analytical or theoretical context, and released video games as the population from which a 
“characteristic unit” is selected to undertake a case study. We picked one video game to study 
that fulfilled Flyvbjerg’s (2011: p. 307) description of a “critical case” - a case that permits a 
deduction of the type “If it is valid for this case, it is valid for all (or many) cases.” 
 
3.3. Data collection  
We approached a video game developer that we call Dutch Video Game Developer 
(DVGD) for data.2 The firm was selected because of its similarities with other small-sized 
                                                        
1 http://whoneedschillingo.com/ - Last accessed, 06/04/2012. 
2 The video game industry’s global production chain is centered on three geographical hotbeds; United States, 
Japan and Europe in which the United Kingdom and France play focal roles (Johns, 2006; Storz, 2008). Although 
the Netherlands has a lively game development industry (expected market volume of € 703 million in 2012) with 
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content producers in the video game industry. Traditionally, the firm worked with 
international publishers such as Electronic Arts and Capcom based on the physical, work-for-
hire, distribution business model. As in the case of other international content developers, 
DVGD explored the opportunities and challenges brought forward by the online distribution 
by the prospect of greater independence and higher economic returns.  
Our empirical setting is the repeated commercialization of one game, which to 
preserve confidentiality we call ‘Chicken’s Tale’,  using two alternative commercialization 
strategies: an artist-led-distribution strategy, and a strategic alliance strategy with an 
incumbent publisher. DVGD has allied itself with a reputable publisher that has several best-
selling games in its portfolio. It is also critically acclaimed with a BAFTA and an Apple 
Design award. DVGD collaborated exclusively with the publisher for the commercialization 
of Chicken’s Tale. The alliance was established by formal agreement between both parties, in 
which the publisher’s ultimate payment depends on the game’s success.  
By focusing on a single firm that commercializes near identical content onto two 
comparable channels, we conduct a naturally occurring quasi-experiment in which producer 
and content differences (i.e., differences in producer capabilities and quality of content), 
which may affect the products’ performance, are minimized. Furthermore, by analyzing both 
the specific actions and the relative success measures for each channel, we can meaningfully 
compare the financial and market performance from each strategy. 
Data were collected from multiple sources (cf. Webb et al., 1966). These included 
proprietary sales-tracking databases monitoring sales activity, and semi-structured face-to-
face interviews that lasted between 30 and 60 minutes with employees (11) and co-founders 
(2); email communication with publisher and platform owners, and company documentation 
                                                        
some internationally renowned firms (e.g., game developer Guerrilla with its popular Killzone franchise and digital 
distribution specialist W!Games), most of the 250 firms have yet to achieve international recognition from 
publishers and consumers alike. The advent of the online channel provides the Dutch videogame developers with 
an opportunity to increase their chances of international exposure.  
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such as contracts and business plans. We also obtained data from email conversations 
between DVGD and the publisher and the platform owners, and participant observations held 
between March 2009 and August 2009. The embedded and multifaceted design of the study in 
conjunction with triangulation of the data adds to the robustness of the findings (Eisenhardt, 
1989). To increase the validity of our findings, the interpretations of the data have been cross-
checked by the co-founders of the firm. 
 
<<<<INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE>>>> 
 
The sales tracking period for both releases was 125 days from release. At the time of 
the games’ release (May 2008 and May 2009 for the artist-led-distribution and the strategic 
alliance strategy respectively), the distribution channels onto which the content was released 
were comparable in terms of installed base (around 40 million users), phase in the channels’ 
lifecycles (<1 year old), and geographical scope (North America, South America, Europe, and 
Australasia). We measure performance both in terms of how well the games perform in their 




4.1. Artist-led-distribution strategy 
Specialized complementary assets. Analysis of in-house availability of 
complementary assets shows that DVGD lacks important assets for successful 
commercialization. Firstly, in its ten years of being operative, DVGD developed on average 
 18 
one video game a year. This is in mark contrast to incumbent publishers who release on 
average between 40 and 50 games each year.3  
Secondly, DVGD did not have a formal marketing budget, neither was there any 
expertise in marketing or promotional activities. Having traditionally relied on marketing 
performed by publishers, the firm’s founders never invested in marketing, intellectually or 
monetarily. The founders lack a broad skills set that is often necessary for startup success 
(Lazear, 2005), having specialized from the outset in information technology and software 
design. For the artist-led-distribution commercialization of Chicken’s Tale, the founders 
therefore recruited an intern to assist with marketing responsibilities such as writing a press 
release, plotting out a pricing strategy, assisting in promotional activities, and approaching the 
mass media for writing reviews. As a database with relevant contacts was absent, DVGD 
lacked access to mass media that have the ability to select and certify content through 
favorable product reviews and features. This turned out to be a major hurdle for bringing 
Chicken’s Tale to the attention of the media in the artist-led-distribution. The process of 
securing reviews for Chicken’s Tale was for this reason ad-hoc and uncoordinated.  
Furthermore, whereas DVGD was in close contact with technical staff at various 
platform owners, the firm did not have strong relationships with marketing staff at these 
organizations, an important drawback when the functional divisions between technical and 
marketing functions in firms is taken into account. An analysis of email exchanges revealed 
that DVGD also attempted to persuade the platform owner to feature its content onto the 
digital storefront, but ultimately did not succeed. 
Finally, despite DVGD previously establishing relationships with international 
publishers, and introducing several games to the market, DVGD did not have a strong 
reputation in the industry. Publishers saw the firm as a team that could deliver quality content, 
                                                        
3 http://www.infendo.com/ea-to-reduce-yearly-game-output-by-40/ - Last accessed 06/04/2012. 
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albeit at a price above market standards, but not an organization that could deliver ‘hit’ 
games. Much to the annoyance of the company’s staff, DVGD’s games, Chicken’s Tale 
included, had repeatedly been nominated for the national industry awards, Dutch Game 
Awards, yet never gotten the expert consecration the staff hoped for.  
The results demonstrate that at the time of the artist-led-distribution strategy, DVGD 
did not have in place a large portfolio, marketing capabilities or a large promotional budget, 
did not have access to important access and evaluator gatekeepers, and was not able to 
demonstrate its reputation as a high-quality developer.   
Performance. Chicken’s Tale sold for an average selling price of €9.00 throughout its 
lifecycle. The average selling price was slightly lower than the market average of €9.54 on the 
respective online distribution channel (Table 1). Figure 1 shows that the most apparent surge 
in sales occurred at day 14, when sales jumped from 296 to 1,265 units per day (+427%). This 
spike is attributed to a sequential launch of the game first in Europe followed by the United 
States. The sequencing was caused by unforeseen differences in submission procedures 
between the European and North American offices of the platform owner, and had not been 
chosen purposefully. Recurring spikes in the game’s performance are attributed to increased 
shopping activity during weekends on the digital platform. In total, the game sold 20,961 
units, generating total revenues of €88,347.  
 
<<<INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE>>> 
 
According to industry expert Simon Carless (Carless, 2009), who provides an analysis 
of relative success in terms of units sold per online distribution platform, the artist-led-
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distribution Chicken’s Tale resides in the low-end of the market in terms of cumulative sales.4 
Within the distribution channel’s sales standards, Chicken’s Tale co-exists with the bulk (60% 
lower end of the market) of the products that are considered as unsuccessful and sell no more 
than 25,000 units (Table 1).  
 
4.2. Strategic alliance strategy 
Specialized complementary assets. In the strategic alliance strategy, DVGD 
partnered with an incumbent publisher to commercialize Chicken’s Tale on a different but 
comparable distribution channel. The partnering meant that Chicken’s Tale could be 
commercialized with the help of the publisher’s specialized complementary asset position. 
The publisher’s large portfolio (>40 games) put it in a strong bargaining position 
during negotiations with the platform owner, and increased its ability to obtain favorable 
reviews from mass media. Furthermore, in conversations with both DVGD and the publisher 
it became apparent that a significant share of Chicken’s Tale’s sales had been generated by 
customers of other games in the publisher’s portfolio through cross-selling promotional 
campaigns. 
The publisher’s marketing capabilities were put to use prior to the content’s release to 
create a ‘buzz’ around the game. A six week timeline composite of promotional activities was 
planned and acted upon in order to generate maximum awareness. Various methods were used 
including organizing promotional contests, securing product previews, and arranging for 
media interviews with game’s developers. The publisher increased media attention post-
release by securing product reviews and by bringing product updates to the attention of the 
                                                        
4 At the time of analysis Simon Carless was chairman of the highly respected Independent Games Festival and 
publisher of online publication Gamasutra with a readership in excess of one million unique visitors per month. 
DVGD’s marketing plan reveals that the firm recognizes and adheres to the metrics provided by Carless. 
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press. Setting and monitoring the pricing strategy was another large part of the publisher’s 
marketing capabilities.  
For the first 41 days after release the game was sold for €3.99. Thereafter, starting on 
day 43 until day 56, the product had a price discount period and sold for €0.79. Sales jumped 
from an average of 400 units per day to 6,400 units during this period (see Figure 2). The 
price discount period was followed by a transition price of €1.59 for the 20 days hereafter. 
Average units sold per day dropped to 1,700 units per day. Finally, in the remainder of the 
sales tracking period, the product was sold for its original price of €3.99. 
The publisher’s relationships with gatekeepers resulted in a large boost in sales and 
revenues. Despite being essentially identical to the first release, when the publisher contacted 
prominent evaluators for product reviews, Chicken’s Tale received significantly higher 
evaluations compared to the artist-led-distribution strategy.5 This was a boost to the game 
with significant market impact since studies that show a causal relationship between the mean 
scores of video game reviews, and their market performance (Binken and Stremersch, 2009). 
An additional boost, subsequently, resulted from the publisher’s staff visit to the platform 
owner. The publisher’s staff convinced the platform owner to feature Chicken’s Tale on its 
online storefront through preferential product placement.6 The effect of the feature was 
immediately noticeable and its effect on sales pertained for two weeks. Sales jumped from 
390 units to 1,385 units sold per day in response to the feature (+355%).  
The results demonstrate that as a function of the established strategic alliance, DVGD 
was able to use the publisher’s specialized complementary assets, in particular the publisher’s 
                                                        
5 An unpaired Student’s t-test demonstrated that the mean review scores for the artist-led distribution strategy is 
79%, whereas it is 86% for the strategic alliance strategy. The mean difference is significant at the 10% 
significance level. 
6 Platform owners can decide to showcase content on the platform’s storefront website. In what amounts to tacit 
endorsement, consumers are presented with prominently displayed content when they log into the website. 
Decision rationales for featuring content are erratic yet depend on an ever changing agenda for showcasing the 
platforms’ most prospective content to consumers. Close-knit relationships with platform owners allow publishers 
to match their release schedules and lobby in accordance with these agendas to increase the probability of having 
their content featured. 
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large portfolio, its marketing competencies, and relationship with gatekeepers, to successfully 
re-launch the game on the second distribution channel. The endorsement of DVGD by the 
publisher also led to reputational benefits for the game developer.   
 
<<<INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE>>> 
 
Performance. The publisher sold 135,288 units during the 125 days sales tracking 
period with an average weighted selling price of €1.45. The average selling price was slightly 
above the €1.32 average selling price for the Top 10 bestselling games on the platform. 
According to Carless (2009), the number of units sold can be considered successful respective 
to the platform’s standards. Due to strong competition on the platform, 95% of the content 
published fails to sell over 5,000 units. The publisher was paid a 10% fee per unit sold in the 
first month from release and a 15% fee thereafter, totaling €14,847. Total net revenues 
generated from Chicken’s Tale for DVGD accumulate to € 95,516. 
 
4.3. Results comparison 
Figure 3 provides a comparison of the number of units sold when DVGD used artist-
led-distribution versus strategic alliance. To facilitate interpretation we log-transformed the 
number of units sold. Examining Figure 3 it is clear that not only does the strategic alliance 
release generate significantly higher sales by comparison to the artist-led-distribution strategy 
from the product’s launch,  but also that this strategy delivers consistently higher sales 
throughout the rest of the tracking period. Thus the evidence supports the conclusion that the 
pre-release activities by the publisher pay off in terms of higher number units sold . This is 
further supported by Table 2 which summarizes the case study’s findings and the financial 
results of both commercialization strategies. The lower average selling price for the strategic 
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alliance strategy as compared to that of the artist-led-distribution strategy is a result of the 
common pricing strategies on each platform rather than being due to differences in content. 
Despite the lower average selling price and the publisher fees (€14,847), the strategic alliance 
strategy resulted in €7,169 higher net cumulative revenues. The higher performance of the 
strategic alliance strategy is not only noticeable when analyzing the number of units sold 
(135,288 units against 20,961 units), but also through classification of relative market success 
as defined by Carless (2009): 5% top end of the market for the strategic alliance strategy 
versus 60% lower end of the market in the case of the artist-led-distribution strategy. 
 




In the creative industries, incumbent publishers seek positions in which they extract 
value from others in the chain by virtue of controlling access to specialized complementary 
assets and downstream markets (Rey and Tirole, 1997). Technological advancements, 
specifically online channels of distribution, allow upstream firms to bypass firms that have 
previously controlled access to markets. According to authors favoring an artist-led 
distribution strategy, since the digitizable content can be distributed at virtually no cost, it 
should not only reduce the power of publishers, but in the long run should eliminate their 
function entirely (Bockstedt et al., 2006; Clemons et al., 2003). Indeed, many content 
producers, not only in the video game industry, have concluded that their future depends on 
developing direct-to-consumer business models (Rayport and Sviokla, 1995). However, 
notwithstanding the persuasiveness of this view to researchers and practitioners alike, 
commercial success has been mixed at best.  
 24 
The explanation for this empirical finding may be attributed to a constrained view of 
how value chains work. Rather than following a static view in which content producers can 
capture more value by skipping stages and clawing back the value that was previously 
appropriated by publishers, it seems that a more dynamic view is necessary. In the creation 
and appropriation of value, Teece (1986; 2006; 2010) sees value chain stages not as additive 
but as interactive. Value is not always created in one stage and then transferred to the next. 
Instead, it is often jointly created when one part in the value chain provides specialized 
complementary assets that allow another part to enhance the value of its basic product. From 
this perspective, artist-led distribution business models that bypass publishers often only 
consider one of their value functions, distribution, but ignore other functions such as 
selection, certification and promotion that are created through the publisher’s specialized 
complementary assets, and that are important to success. To build successful business models 
that market directly to consumers, it is not sufficient for content producers to go online, they 
must also build or acquire these specialized assets.   
 The difference between an additive and interactive view of the value chain, at least in 
the case we examine in this paper, comes down to whether the specialized complementary 
assets generate sufficient value for upstream content producers. This is generally a difficult 
question to answer empirically, since the interaction between content and specialized 
complementary assets is idiosyncratic. Every creative product is unique (Caves, 2000), so the 
way in which they combine with complementary assets is usually unpredictable and often not 
well understood even by the owners of these assets. One way to assess the contribution of 
specialized complementary assets would be to control for the one-of-a-kind property of 
creative contents by releasing the same content with, and without, relying on specialized 
complementary specialized assets.  
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Researchers are rarely in the possession of resources needed to conduct such an 
experiment, let alone have access to confidential sales and revenues data. We were fortunate 
to be given access to a content producer that had undergone precisely this experience. Our 
results show that while our content producer had to forgo substantive value to the publisher, it 
still came out ahead because the total value created by combining their operation was much 
greater than the value created by distributing the game directly to the market. 
The evidence clearly supports the view first proposed by Teece (1986; 2006) that 
value chains are interactive, in the sense that different stages in the value chain complement 
each other and create synergetic effects for the end consumer. The evidence also suggests that 
building online direct-to-consumer business models in the video game industry, and perhaps 
in creative industries more generally, may not be as easy as was assumed during the 
pioneering phase of the Internet. Specialized complementary assets matter, and there is no 
obvious way in which new technologies can replace them. 
The full consequences of the Internet on the actors’ roles within the value chain go 
beyond what is studied in this paper. To understand the influence of the Internet on the 
evolution of the institutional structure of the video game industry and the vertical scope of 
content producers and publishers, we rely on the work of authors such as Jacobides and 
Winter (2005), Langlois (2003) and Sturgeon (2002). To do this, we must consider the 
industry’s value chain before the advent of the Internet. The industry’s value chain at that 
point relied on physical distribution of video games which consumers bought in retail 
establishments. For consumers, transaction costs associated with this method of shopping 
included the costs of finding and visiting the store. If they came with a specific game in mind, 
they were confronted with the risk that the game was out of stock. On the other hand, if they 
were exploring, they had to browse through a collection that was limited by the available shelf 
 26 
space. If they were not happy with what was on offer, they had to incur the costs of visiting 
other retail establishments.     
Even when consumers made the extra effort of going elsewhere, they were unlikely to 
find greater diversity. The economies of physical distribution and retailing militated against 
product diversity, partly because a wider range of games is more costly to stock, but mostly 
because retailers looked to publishers to select and market products that will maximize sales 
per unit retail space. Publishers, for their part, screened out games that had low potential for 
becoming best sellers, and poured marketing and promotion resources into those that did. All 
together this created a ‘winner-takes-all’ competition that entrenched the power of incumbent 
content producers, and tended to shut out new entrants (Caves, 2000).  
 The online channel removed the constraints imposed by physical distribution and 
retailing, and in theory presaged the decline of publishing as a crucial part of the value chain. 
In practice, this did not turn out to be the case. Publishing may no longer control physical 
access to retailing, but it continues to fulfill an essential role in determining the success of 
video games. A plausible explanation for this can be found in Langlois’ (2003) distinction 
between static and dynamic transaction costs analysis. The static transaction costs analysis 
framework, which originates from work by Coase (1937) that was developed further by 
Williamson (1975), argues that when market transaction costs rise firms will internalize 
activities, whereas they will externalize activities as internal governance costs rise. This static 
framework ignores the evolutionary dynamics of markets, specifically it overlooks how the 
evolving market context shapes the interaction of transactions with the environment in which 
they are embedded (Jacobides and Winter, 2005; Langlois, 2003). Thus, market transaction 
costs may rise, but after a short time (in historical terms), they will often fall again. The fall is 
often due to institutions and technologies that initially caused transaction costs to rise, begin 
to adjust, and in the process bring down transaction costs.           
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The interaction between transactions and their environments that Langlois (2003) 
describes as ‘dynamic transaction costs’ provides an explanation for the continued resilience 
of incumbent publishers. In our case, however, transaction costs for consumers first fall 
(lower reproduction costs and price, and lower search costs), and then rise (cost of search). 
The emergence of online distribution opened the way for low transaction costs interaction 
with consumers, as consumers can directly download their favorite video games at lower 
prices. However, the amount of online games offered by content producers has significantly 
risen, as publishers’ scale-based resource advantages that formed entry barriers have been 
eliminated. This rapid expansion in the number of new products being launched into the 
market reversed the drop in transaction costs by increasing consumers’ search costs. In effect, 
online distribution which held out the promise of giving all content producers, small and 
large, a level playing field, actually created information congestion that made it harder for 
consumers to find and select a game of their choice, and then transact. As transaction costs 
rose, the publishers which seemed increasingly irrelevant to many in the industry, 
reestablished their role as selectors, evaluators, and marketers.    
What publishers could not do, however, is reestablish their previous power over 
distribution. Online distribution meant that content producers now had alternatives to physical 
distribution. Publishers’ strategy therefore changed to reflect the fact that they no longer have 
the ability to block content producers from accessing markets if they are unwilling to accept 
the terms being offered. Instead, publishers now have to rely almost entirely on contracting 
their specialized complementary assets to content producers on short, or long-term basis, 
depending on the kind of alliance envisaged.     
 
6.  Research limitations and future research 
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Our research has certain limitations that must be addressed, but that also offer avenues 
for future research. Our interpretation is ultimately based on one case and one industry. 
Larger sample studies are needed before we can arrive at the conclusion that video game 
producers that lack complementary assets will generally fare better by following a strategic 
alliance strategy. The same holds for generalizing this finding to other industry contexts. We 
suggest a product and organizational approach to addressing the relative success of 
commercialization strategies. The first is to study relative product performance of the chosen 
commercialization strategies of a large amount of product introductions, using variables such 
as expert scores and awards as quality indicators; and, marketing expenditures and portfolio 
size as controls. The other approach is survivor analysis of content producers. Specialized 
content production is a high risk business in most creative industries. As in our case, many 
content producers use both artist-led-distribution and strategic alliance strategies with 
publishers. The question that inevitably arises is whether content producers that rely more on 
artist-led-distribution are less likely to survive than peers that form alliances with publishers. 
A single case study design is insufficient to provide an answer to this question. Nor is it likely 
that one commercialization strategy will always be superior to the other. There are 
contingencies such as firm reputation, or the stage of the industry life cycle, that can impact 
commercialization in such a way as to tilt the overall success of each strategy. Obtaining 
deeper understanding of artist-led-distribution versus alliance strategy clearly requires sample 
studies with proper controls for firm and market factors.  
Our paper examines a transition period in the evolution of the video game industry. It 
does not, therefore, address the long-run configuration of the industry architecture of the 
video game industry (cf. Jacobides et al., 2006). In an attempt to overcome the dependence on 
specialized complementary assets controlled by powerful incumbents, entrepreneurial content 
producers may try to mobilize resources into the development of these specialized assets and 
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in time learn how to mimic publishers’ assets and alter the degree of specialization between 
actors and the power structures within the value chain (Pisano and Teece, 2007; Stevenson 
and Gumpert, 1985). Previous studies have shown how new entrants in nascent markets have 
successfully strengthened their position vis-à-vis competitors through actively shaping the 
industry architecture (Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009; Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009). Future 
research should address the issue of content producers’ attempts to shape the industry 
architecture in favor of their market position vis-à-vis publishers’ market power and their 
effectiveness in doing so. 
Finally, we believe that our study should be extended to other creative industries. In 
the music industry, for instance, music labels, the equivalent of publishers in our case, own 
different bundles of specialized complementary assets. There is considerable controversy as to 
which of these bundles (e.g. talent development, production, promotion, and relationships 
with gatekeepers), add substantial value to upstream content producers (i.e. artists), and which 
do not (Lam and Tan, 2001). By the same token, independent film production has for many 
decades sought to bypass studio distribution (Cunnigham and Silver, 2012). The advent of 
online distribution has been energetically pursued by independent film producers as a way of 
breaking away from their dependence on the major Hollywood studios, but as of now their 
efforts have run up against the reality that film distribution is much more than simply making 







The authors acknowledge the valuable input of Wilfred Dolfsma who provided guidance on 
an early version of the manuscript. We would also like to thank participants at the March 14 
2012 research seminar at Nottingham University Ningbo, China, as well as the participants at 
the 2nd Tilburg Conference on Innovation, held at Oisterwijk, the Netherlands, on June 16 
2012 for useful input. We kindly thank two anonymous reviewers for their comments on the 
manuscript. The usual disclaimer applies. 
References 
Amit, R. and Zott, C., 2001. Value creation in e-business. Strategic Management Journal 22, 
493-520. 
Barney, J., 1991. Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of 
Management 17, 99-120. 
Binken, J.L.G., Stremersch, S., 2009. The effect of superstar software on hardware sales in 
system markets. Journal of Marketing 73, 88-104. 
Bockstedt, J.C., Kauffman, J., Riggins, F.J., 2006. The move to artist-led on-line music 
distribution: a theory-based assessment and prospects for structural changes in the digital 
music market. International Journal of Electronic Commerce 10, 7-38. 
Broekhuizen, T.L.J., Delre, S.A., Torres, A., 2011. Simulating the cinema market: how cross-
cultural differences in social influence explain box office distributions. Journal of Product 
Innovation Management 28, 202-215.  
Carless, S., 2009. Rules for indie game success: the metrics. Digital distribution summit, 
Conference Presentation, Melbourne, Australia. 
Caves, R.E., 2000. Creative industries: contracts between arts and commerce. Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, England. 
 31 
Clemons, E. K., Lang, K.R., 2003. The decoupling of value creation from revenue: a strategic 
analysis of the markets for pure information goods. Information Technology 
Management 4(2-3), 259-287. 
Clemons, E.K., Gu, B., Lang, K.R., 2003. Newly vulnerable markets in an age of pure 
information products: an analysis of online music and online news. Journal of 
Management Information Systems 19, 17-41. 
Colombo, M., Grilli, L. and Piva, E., 2006. In search of complementary assets: the 
determinants of alliance formation of high-tech start-ups. Research Policy 35(8), 1166-
1199. 
Coase, R.H., 1937. The nature of the firm. Economica 4, 386-405. 
Cunnigham, S., Silver, J., 2012. On-line film distribution: its history and global complexion. 
In: D. Iordanova and S. Cunningham (Eds.), Digital disruption: cinema moves on-line. St 
Andrews Film Studies, St Andrews, pp. 33-66. 
De Vany, A. 2004. Hollywood economics: how extreme uncertainty shapes the film industry. 
Routledge, London.  
De Vany, A., Walls, D., 1996. Bose-Einstein dynamics and adaptive contracting in the motion 
picture industry. The Economic Journal 106, 1493-1514. 
DiMaggio, P.J., 1988. Interest and agency in institutional theory. In: L.G. Zucker (Ed.), 
Institutional patterns and organizations: culture and environment, Ballinger, Cambridge, 
Mass, pp. 3-21. 
Elberse, A., Anand, B.N., 2007. The effectiveness of pre-release advertising for motion 
pictures: an empirical investigation using a simulated market. Information Economics 
and Policy 19(3-4), 319-343. 
 32 
Eliashberg, J., Elberse, A., Leenders, M.A.A.M., 2006. The motion picture industry: critical 
issues in practice, Current Research, and New Research Directions, Marketing Science 
25(6), 638-661.  
Finney, A., 2010. The international film business: a market guide beyond, Routledge, Milton 
Park, Abingdon. 
Flyvbjerg, B., 2011, Case study. In: N.K. Denzin and Y.S. Lincoln, (Eds.), The Sage 
Handbook of Qualitative Research, 4th ed., Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA, pp. 311-313. 
Gans, J., Hsu, D., Stern, S., 2002. When does start-up innovation spur the gale of creative 
destruction? RAND Journal of Economics 33(4), 571-586. 
Gans, J., Stern, S., 2003. The product market and the market for “ideas”: commercialization 
strategies for technology entrepreneurs. Research Policy 32(2), 333-350. 
Gemser, G., Leenders, M.A.A.M., Wijnberg, N.M.,  2008. Why some awards are more 
effective signals of quality than others: a study of movie awards. Journal of Management 
34, 25-54. 
Haefliger, S., Jäger, P., von Krogh, G., 2010. Under the radar: industry entry by user 
entrepreneurs. Research Policy 39(9), 1198-1213.  
Hirsch, P.M., 1972. Processing fads and fashions: an organization-set of cultural industry 
systems. American Journal of Sociology 77(4), 639-659. 
IDG2011a, Industry Report. 
IDG 2011b. IDG thought piece on digital gaming, October 2011, IDG. 
Jacobides, M.G., Billinger, S., 2006. Designing the boundaries of the firm: from “make, buy, 
or ally” to the dynamic benefits of vertical architecture. Organization Science 17(2), 249-
261.  
 33 
Jacobides, M.G., Knudsen, T., Augier, M., 2006. Benefiting from innovation: value creation, 
value appropriation and the role of industry architectures. Research Policy 35(8), 1200-
1221.  
Jacobides, M.G., Winter, S.G., 2005. The co-evolution of capabilities and transaction costs: 
explaining the institutional structure of production. Strategic Management Journal 26(5), 
395-413. 
Kasper, W., Streit, M.E., 1998. Institutional economics: social order and public policy. 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. 
Koza, M.P., Lewin, A.Y., 1998. The co-evolution of strategic alliances. Organization Science 
9(3), 255-264. 
Kretschmer, M., Klimis, G.M., Choi, C.J., 1999. Increasing returns and social contagion in 
cultural industries. British Journal of Management 10, 61-72. 
Kretschmer, M., Klimis, G.M., Wallis, R., 2001. Music in electronic markets. New Media & 
Society 3(4), 417-441. 
Lam, C.K.M., Tan, C.Y., 2001. The Internet is changing the music industry. Communications 
of the ACM 44, 62-68. 
Lazear, E., 2005. Entrepreneurship, Journal of Labor Economics 23(4), 649-680. 
Lampel, J., and Shamsie, J., 2000. Critical push: sources of strategic momentum in the motion 
picture industry. Journal of Management 26(2), 233-257. 
Lampel, J., Lant, T., Shamsie, J., 2000. Balancing act: learning from organizing practices in 
cultural industries. Organization Science 11(3), 263-269. 
Langlois, R.N., 2003. The vanishing hand: the changing dynamics of industrial capitalism. 
Industrial and Corporate Change 12(2), 351-385. 
Malecki, E., Tootle D., 1996. The role of networks in small firm competitiveness. 
International Journal of Technology Management 11, 43-57. 
 34 
Meyer, G.D., Alvares, S.A., Blasick, J., 1997. Benefits of technology-based strategic 
alliances: an entrepreneurial perspective. In: Frontiers of entrepreneurship research. 
Babson College, Wellesley, Mass. 
Mol, J.M., Wijnberg, N.M., Carroll, C., 2005. Value chain envy: explaining new entry and 
vertical integration in popular music. Journal of Management Studies 42(2), 251-276. 
Nerkar, A., Roberts, P., 2004. Technological and product-market experience and the success 
of new product introductions in the pharmaceutical industry. Strategic Management 
Journal 25 (8/9), 779-799. 
Ozcan, P., Eisenhardt, K.M., 2009. Origin of alliance portfolios: entrepreneurs, network 
strategies, and firm performance. Academy of Management Journal 52(2), 246-279.  
Pisano, G.P., Teece, D.J., 2007. How to capture value from innovation: shaping intellectual 
property and industry architecture. California Management Review 50(1), 278-296. 
Prashantham, S., Birkinshaw J.M., 2008. Dancing with gorillas: how small companies can 
partner effectively with multinational corporations. California Management Review 
51(1), 6-23. 
Priem, R.L., 2007. A consumer perspective on value creation. Academy of Management 
Review 32(1), 219-235. 
Rao, R.S., Chandy, R.K. and Prabhu, J.C., 2008. Fruits of legitimacy: why some new ventures 
gain more from innovation than others. Journal of Marketing 72, 58-75. 
Rayport, J.F., Sviokla, J.J., 1995. Exploiting the virtual value chain. Harvard Business Review 
November-December, 75-85. 
Rothaermel, F.T., 2001. Incumbent’s advantage through exploiting complementary assets via 
interfirm cooperation. Strategic Management Journal 22(6-7), 687-699. 
Rothaermel, F.T., Deeds, D.L., 2004. Exploration and exploitation alliances in biotechnology: 
a system of new product development. Strategic Management Journal 25(3), 201-221. 
 35 
Rothaermel, F.T., Hill, C.W.L., 2005. Technological discontinuities and complementary 
assets: a longitudinal study of industry and firm performance. Organization Science 16, 
52-70. 
Santos, F.M., Eisenhardt, K.M., 2009. Constructing markets and shaping boundaries: 
entrepreneurial power in nascent fields. Academy of Management Journal 52(4), 643-
671. 
Spekman, R.E., Isabella, L.A., MacAvoy, T.C., 2000. Alliance competence: maximizing the 
value of your partnership. Wiley, New York. 
Spence, A.M., 1973. Job market signaling. Quarterly Journal of Economics 87(3), 355-374. 
Stevenson, H., Gumpert, D., 1985. The heart of entrepreneurship. Harvard Business Review 
63, 85-94. 
Storz, C., 2008. Dynamics in innovation systems: evidence from Japan’s game software 
industry. Research Policy 37(9), 1480-1491.  
Sturgeon, T., 2002. Modular production networks: a new American model of 
industrial organization, Industrial and Corporate Change 11(3), 451-496. 
Stuart, T.E., Hoang, H., Hybels, R.C., 1999. Interorganizational endorsements and the 
performance of entrepreneurial ventures. Administrative Science Quarterly 44, 315-349.  
Teece, D.J., 1986. Profiting from technological innovation: implications for integration, 
collaboration, licensing and public policy. Research Policy 15(6), 285-305. 
Teece, D.J., 1992. Competition, cooperation and innovation: organizational arrangements for 
regimes of rapid technological progress. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 
18, 1-25. 
Teece, D.J., 2006. Reflections on "Profiting from innovations". Research Policy 35(8), 1131-
1146. 
 36 
Teece, D.J., 2010. Forward integration and innovation: transaction costs and beyond. Journal 
of Retailing 86(3), 277-283. 
Thomas, G., 2011. A typology for the case study in social science following a review of a 
definition, discourse and structure. Qualitative Inquiry 17(6), 511-521. 
Webb, E.J., Campbell, D.T., Schwartz, R.D., Sechrest, L., 1966. Unobtrusive measures: 
nonreactive measures in the social sciences. Rand McNally, Chicago, IL. 
Wijnberg, N.M., Gemser, G., 2000. Adding value to innovation: impressionism and the 
transformation of the selection system in visual arts. Organization Science 11(3), 323-
329.  
Williamson, O.E., 1975. Markets and hierarchies: analysis and antitrust implications. Free 
Press, New York. 
Williamson, O., 1991. Comparative economic organization: the analysis of discrete structural 
alternatives. Administrative Science Quarterly 36, 269-296. 
Yadav, M.S., Varadarajan, P.R., 2005. Understanding product migration to the electronic 
marketplace: a conceptual framework. Journal of Retailing 81(2), 125-140. 


















25,000 units  
























5% of all 
products 
Installed base  42,500,000 users 37,000,000 users 
Average selling 
price 
 € 9.54 $ 1.89 (€1.32) 
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Table 2. Summary of the case study findings 
 Artist-led-distribution strategy Strategic alliance strategy 
Portfolio of 
content 
Small portfolio of ten games. 
Limited means for cross-promotion. 
Large portfolio of 40+ games. 




No marketing expertise or formal 
budget available. 
Publisher’s marketing expertise and 
budget. 
 Static pricing strategy. Dynamic pricing strategy resulted 
in top 10 listing. 
 No pre-release marketing activities. Pre-release marketing activities: 
promotional contest, developer 
interviews, and product previews.  
 No access to mass-media actors. Access to mass-media actors. 
Relationships 
with gatekeepers 
Limited access to evaluator 
gatekeepers. Few but favorable 
product reviews in magazines and on 
websites (79%). 
Access to evaluator gatekeepers. 
Reasonable amount and even more 
favorable product reviews in 
magazines and on websites (86%). 
 Limited access to access gatekeepers. 
Unsuccessful attempt to ask platform 
owner to feature product. 
Relationship with platform owners 
resulted in favorable product 
placement in storefront of platform.  
Reputation/ 
Reputable name  
Absence of strong reputation in the 
eyes of mass media, evaluator 
gatekeepers and platforms; no 
awards won or hit product produced. 
Strong reputation in the eyes of 
mass media, evaluator gatekeepers 
and platform owners; Apple and 
BAFTA awards won, hit product 
produced.  
Overall access to 
complementary 
assets 
Low  High 
Financial performance 
Total units sold 20,961 135,288 
Relative market 
performance 
60% lower end of market 5% top end of market 
Net revenue  €88,347 €95,516 
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